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1

Introduction

Communication is an essential part of organizations. Decision-makers (owners, top
management) often rely on better-informed parties within the same firm (lower-level
managers, division heads) to provide relevant information. An agency problem arises
when the informed parties’ objectives are not aligned with the decision-makers’. In these
cases, there are two potential sources of inefficiency. First, informed agents may dissipate
considerable resources in influence activities. Second, decision-makers may make wrong
decisions due to being poorly informed or swayed. As a result, organizations must structure
communication to minimize wasteful influence activities while maximizing decision-makers’
accuracy. This paper is concerned with communication protocols that achieve this goal.
To analyze communication protocols, I study a costly signaling game between an
uninformed receiver and one or more informed senders. The receiver must select one of
two actions. Senders know which action is better for the receiver. When communicating,
senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the lie. These costs
represent the resources senders allocate to influence the receiver’s decision. For example, a
manager who shifts subordinates’ labor to fabricate data will have fewer resources for the
organization’s production activities. As a result, the manager may underperform or incur
penalties. From the organization’s perspective, these influence activities are unproductive
and wasteful. Before making a decision, the receiver interacts with the senders in a way
pre-determined by a communication protocol.
Communication protocols specify the organization’s mode of communication: how many
senders to consult, their relative standing over decision-making, and the confidentiality
of their recommendations. For example, a protocol may instruct the receiver to consult
only one sender that favors a particular action (such as the head of a division that would
benefit from a specific investment). Alternatively, it may specify to consult in a private
setting two senders with aligned goals (e.g., members of the same department). The focus
of this paper is to identify and study efficient communication protocols. Efficiency requires
that all players obtain their complete-information payoff. An efficient protocol is critical
in organizations because it solves asymmetric information problems without dissipating
resources in unproductive signaling.
An additional desirable property of communication protocols is their robustness to
senders’ collusion. To study robust protocols, I use the notion of “coalition-proofness”
developed by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987). This solution concept allows testing
whether a protocol remains effective when players can engage in non-binding pre-play
communication. It allows senders to discuss their strategies before consultation, but not
to make commitments. For example, managers may share their intentions with each other
before filing a report to the CEO. Even though managers are unable to make credible and
3
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binding commitments, they may be able to coordinate with significant consequences. As
we shall see, coalition-proofness turns out to be crucial for the main result.
The first part of the paper establishes necessary conditions for efficiency and robustness
to collusion. Single-sender arrangements always result in wasteful persuasion attempts,
whereas no communication results in inaccurate decision-making. It follows that multisender protocols are necessary for efficiency. They are also sufficient, as the receiver
can exploit the senders’ inability to coordinate persuasion by privately consulting more
than one sender. However, private communication protocols are susceptible to collusion:
senders can restore coordination by discussing their strategies before being summoned for
consultation. There is no private protocol that is both efficient and resilient to collusion.
Public protocols prescribe consulting senders through a sequential and public procedure.
These arrangements are neither efficient nor robust to collusion when senders have
relatively aligned preferences over decision-making. In these cases, there are always
contingencies where senders can coordinate persuasion either on the spot or through
pre-play communication.
The second part of this paper focuses on the last type of arrangement left to analyze:
the sequential and public consultation of senders with conflicting interests over decisionmaking. The main results show that this protocol, dubbed “public advocacy,” is both
efficient and robust to collusion. Importantly, it is the only communication protocol to
have both these desirable properties. A characterization of the efficient equilibrium is
provided, showing the mechanism through which the receiver achieves efficiency: the
report delivered by the first speaker sets the burden of proof borne by the second speaker,
who has to prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The endogenously determined
burden of proof ensures that both senders consistently report truthfully. As a result, the
receiver learns their private information and makes fully informed decisions. No resources
are wasted in the attempt to persuade the receiver. All players obtain the payoff they
would get if there were no information asymmetries in the first place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature,
and Section 3 presents the model. The main results are in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
the model’s assumptions and the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2

Literature

This paper contributes to the literature on organization design. In this line of work,
Milgrom (1988) recognizes that influence activities constitute a direct opportunity cost
for organizations. Milgrom (1988) focuses on restrictions of decision makers’ discretion as
a tool to limit these costs. Differently, the current paper is concerned with the design of
4
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communication protocols that eliminate influence activities. Jehiel (1999) and Deimen
and Szalay (2019) also study optimal information structures in organizations. In contrast
with the current paper, they consider settings where there is no disagreement between
players. Without an agency problem, influence activities are not a concern.
A strand of literature finds that optimal organization design results in advocacy
structures. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study the optimal provision of incentives for
information gathering. They consider settings with verifiable information and no agency
problem. Battaglini (2002) takes a different approach by studying strategic communication
with biased senders in a cheap talk framework. Both Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and
Battaglini (2002) make a case for “static” types of advocacy. By contrast, Krishna and
Morgan (2001) show the optimality of a “sequential” kind of advocacy in a cheap talk
model where senders engage in an extended debate. The current work differs from these
papers in three key aspects. First, it is a model of partially verifiable information. Second,
it studies settings where influence activities yield direct costs to the organization that are
not informational. Third, the analysis includes a wider array of arrangements, showing
that “public advocacy” is the only protocol with some desirable characteristics.1
In this model, influence activities are costly due to the presence of misreporting costs.
The signaling structure considered here makes this paper related to the “costly talk”
literature (Kartik, 2009; Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007; Ottaviani & Squintani,
2006). These papers are mainly concerned with the single-sender case. Vaccari (2021)
considers the case where two senders with conflicting goals communicate simultaneously.
As in traditional signaling models, the equilibria of these papers involve wasteful signaling
expenditures. By contrast, Emons and Fluet (2009) construct an efficient equilibrium in a
costly talk setting similar to the public advocacy protocol studied here. Differently from
all these papers, the current work considers a larger class of communication protocols
and equilibria. As a result, the role of collusion, which is central here, is absent in this
literature.

3

The Model

There are N ≥ 1 senders in the set S = {1, . . . , N }, and one receiver (r). Nature selects a
state θ according to some distribution F with density f and full support in Θ = R. Only
the senders observe the realized state. Then, depending on the setting, communication
takes place either sequentially or simultaneously. In a sequential protocol, the order of
communication is determined by senders’ indexes j ∈ S, with sender 1 reporting first,
1

The organization’s problem considered here cannot be appreciated by models where information is
not partially verifiable: influence activities are impossible when information is fully verifiable, and they
come at no cost when information is not verifiable as in cheap talk models.
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and so on. When communicating, sender j ∈ S delivers a report rj ∈ Θ with the literal
or exogenous meaning “the state is θ = rj .” After observing all the senders’ reports, the
receiver selects an alternative a in the binary set {a+ , a− }.
Payoffs.— Player i ∈ S ∪{r} obtains a payoff of ui (a, θ) when the receiver selects action
a in state θ. Define player i’s payoff-difference in state θ as ∆ui (θ) := ui (a+ , θ) − ui (a− , θ).
I assume that ∆ui (θ) is weakly increasing in θ for every i ∈ S ∪{r}. Under this assumption,
the state can be interpreted as a vertical differentiation parameter measuring the relative
appeal of a+ with respect to a− . I normalize the receiver’s payoffs by setting ∆ur (θ) > 0
for all θ > 0, ∆ur (θ) < 0 for all θ < 0, and ∆ur (0) ≥ 0. For every sender j ∈ S, either
∆uj (θ) > 0 for some θ < 0 or ∆uj (θ) < 0 for some θ > 0. I say that two senders j and i
are opposed-biased if ∆ui (0) · ∆uj (0) < 0, and are like-biased otherwise.
Costly talk.— Sender j incurs a finite cost Cj (rj , θ) when delivering report rj in state
θ. The cost function Cj is strictly increasing in |rj − θ| for all rj ∈ Θ, with Cj (θ, θ) = 0.
That is, misreporting is increasingly costly in the size of the lie, whereas truthful reporting
is costless. Sender j’s total utility is2 wj (rj , a, θ) = uj (a, θ) − Cj (rj , θ).
Strategies.— When communication is simultaneous, a pure strategy for sender j is a
function ρj : Θ → Θ. When communication is sequential, a pure strategy for sender j
is a function ρj : Θj → Θ. A profile of reports {rj }N
j=1 is off-path if, given the senders’
strategies, {rj }N
j=1 will never be observed by the receiver. A posterior belief function for
the receiver is a mapping p : ΘN → ∆(Θ) that, given the senders’ reports, generates
posterior beliefs p(θ | {rj }j∈S ). Given the senders’ reports and posterior beliefs p, the
receiver selects an action in the sequentially rational set β, where
β({rj }j∈S ) = arg max Ep [ur (a, θ) | {rj }j∈S ].
a∈{a+ ,a− }

I assume that the receiver selects a+ when indifferent between the two alternatives.
Equilibrium.— The equilibrium concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
To test for the protocols’ robustness against collusion, I use the two related concepts of
strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim
et al., 1987). An equilibrium is strong if no coalition of players can jointly deviate so that
all players in the coalition get strictly better payoffs; it is coalition-proof if it is resilient
against those coalitional deviations that are self-enforcing.3
2

1{·} is the indicator function.
A coalition is self-enforcing if there is no proper sub-coalition that, taking fixed the action of its
complement, can agree to deviate from the deviation in a way that makes all of its members better off.
The type of group deviations considered by the notion of coalition-proofness is consistent with the model
because it preserves its non-cooperative nature. For a formal definition of strong and coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium, see Aumann (1959) and Bernheim et al. (1987), respectively. For a textbook definition of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
3

6
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1393

8

Vaccari: Efficient Communication in Organizations

3.1

Definitions

Here I define concepts that are useful for the analysis that follows. A discussion of the
model’s assumptions ensue in Section 5.
Reach.— I define the reach of sender j in state θ as the report which associated cost
offsets j’s potential gains. Formally, the reach of sender j in state θ is r̄j (θ) := max{rj ∈
R s.t. |∆uj (θ)|= Cj (rj , θ)} if ∆uj (0) > 0, and it is rj (θ) := min{rj ∈ R s.t. |∆uj (θ)|=
¯
Cj (rj , θ)} if ∆uj (0) < 0. Intuitively, in equilibrium sender j will never deliver reports
higher than r̄j (θ) or lower than rj (θ), as these reports are strictly dominated by truthful
¯
reporting independently of the receiver’s decision.
Protocols.— A communication protocol specifies the number N of informed senders
asked to deliver a report, their relative preferences over the final decision, and whether
they communicate simultaneously (privately) or sequentially (publicly).
Efficiency.— In an efficient equilibrium, all players obtain their respective completeinformation payoffs: the receiver selects action a+ when θ ≥ 0 and action a− otherwise;
senders always report truthfully, i.e., ρj (·, θ) = θ for every j ∈ S and θ ∈ Θ. I refer to
equilibria where senders always report truthfully as truthful. A communication protocol is
efficient if it allows for an efficient equilibrium. Since truthful equilibria are fully revealing
while non-truthful ones are wasteful, an equilibrium is efficient if and only if it is truthful.

4

Communication Protocols

The end goal of the first part of this section is to rule out communication protocols that
are either inefficient or not robust to senders’ collusion. A protocol with no senders is not
efficient because it involves decision-making under risk. The following proposition shows
that even single-sender protocols are not efficient.
Proposition 1 (Single-sender protocols). There are no efficient PBE if N = 1.
Proof. Consider a protocol where N = 1 and ∆u1 (0) > 0 (the proof is similar for
∆u1 (0) < 0). Suppose that there exists an efficient PBE where ρ1 (θ) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ.
The receiver’s posterior beliefs are degenerate on θ = r1 . Sender 1 can profitably deviate
by delivering r1 ∈ [0, r̄1 (θ0 )) in some θ0 < 0 where r̄1 (θ0 ) > 0, contradicting the existence
of a PBE in truthful strategies.
Single-sender protocols are inefficient because there are always states in which the
consulted sender misrepresents information. With no other source of advice, the receiver
cannot cross-validate reports to spur truthful reporting. Proposition 1 implies that
multi-sender protocols are necessary for efficiency. The following proposition considers
7
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arrangements where the receiver privately (or simultaneously) consults multiple senders
with any bias configuration.
Proposition 2 (Simultaneous communication). Consider protocols with N ≥ 2 senders
that communicate simultaneously. Efficient PBE of these protocols are not coalition-proof.
Proof. Consider first the case where all senders are like-biased, i.e., ∆uj (0) > 0 for all
j ∈ S (the proof is similar if ∆uj (0) < 0 for all j ∈ S). There exists an efficient PBE where
ρj (θ) = θ for every j ∈ S and θ ∈ Θ, and beliefs p are such that β({rj }j∈S ) = a− if ri 6= rk
for some i, k ∈ S. Given strategies and beliefs, no sender has an incentive to deviate from
truthful reporting. Posterior beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule only for the case
ri = rj for all i, j ∈ S. When all reports are identical, the receiver assigns probability 1 to
θ = rj . Off-path beliefs ensure that individual deviations are not profitable.
However, efficient equilibria of this configuration are not coalition-proof. Consider a
state  < 0 such that min{r̄j ()}j∈S > 0. There is a coalition formed by all senders in
S such that, when the state is , each sender j ∈ S deviates from truthful reporting by
delivering rj = r0 ∈ [0, min{r̄j ()}j∈S ). Upon observing {rj = r0 }j∈S , the receiver selects
action a+ . Given p, if some sender delivers a negative report, then the receiver selects a− .
Therefore, this coalitional deviation is mutually beneficial and self-enforcing: there is no
proper sub-coalition that, taking fixed the action of its complement, can agree to deviate
from the deviation in a way that makes all of its members better off. As a result, every
efficient PBE of this like-biased configuration is not coalition-proof.
Consider now the case where at least two senders are opposed-biased. That is, there
are at least two senders i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, such that ∆ui (0) · ∆uj (0) < 0. I cover this case in
Vaccari (2021). There, I show that misreporting occurs in every PBE when the number of
senders is N = 2. Therefore, no efficient PBE can exist with only two senders. For the
case N > 2, efficient PBE exist but are not coalition-proof.4
There are two reasons why simultaneous communication protocols may seem a promising avenue toward efficiency. First, fully revealing equilibria in truthful strategies exist in
simultaneous cheap talk games with three or more senders with any bias type.5 Second, the
receiver can achieve efficiency even by simultaneously consulting two (or more) like-biased
senders. In this last case, the receiver can induce truthful reporting by applying skepticism
when reports do not coincide. Simultaneous communication protocols can exploit senders’
lack of coordination to make any individual persuasion attempt futile.

4

The omitted proofs are included in Appendix A.
See, for example, the introductory section in Battaglini (2004). In these equilibria, individual
deviations from truthful reporting are immediately detected. The same intuition carries over to the costly
talk signaling structure considered here.
5
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Proposition 2 shows that simultaneous protocols are ineffective when senders can engage
in non-binding pre-play communication. Intuitively, the possibility of discussing strategies
before consultation allows senders to coordinate persuasion in a self-enforcing way. This
result implies that sequential communication protocols are necessary to achieve efficiency
and robustness to collusion jointly. The following proposition considers arrangements
where the receiver sequentially consults multiple like-biased senders.
Proposition 3 (Sequential consultation of like-biased senders). There are no efficient
PBE if there are N ≥ 2 like-biased senders that communicate publicly and sequentially.
Proof. Suppose there is a PBE in truthful strategies where ∆uj (0) > 0 for all j ∈ S (the
proof is analogous if ∆uj (0) < 0 for all j ∈ S). In this equilibrium, ρ1 (θ) = ρn ({rj =
θ}n−1
j=1 , θ) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ and n ∈ {2, . . . , N }. On-path, the receiver’s beliefs are
degenerate on θ = rj , j ∈ S. Consider a state θ0 < 0 and a report r0 ≥ 0 such that
∆uj (θ0 ) > 0 and r̄j (θ0 ) > r0 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S. After observing the tuple of reports
−1
0
0 N
+
{r0 }N
j=1 , sender N can profitably deliver rN = r , as β({r }j=1 ) = a . By induction, the
same is true for every sender j ∈ S. As a result, sender 1 can profitably deviate from
truthful reporting by delivering r1 = r0 , and all subsequent senders would follow suit. This
contradicts the existence of an equilibrium in truthful strategies.
Sequential protocols are problematic for efficiency because they allow like-biased
senders to coordinate persuasion on the spot.6 By publicly misreporting, the first-speaking
sender can incentivize all subsequent senders to follow suit by misreporting as well. It
follows that truthful equilibria cannot be supported by sequential communication protocols
where all senders are like-biased.

4.1

Public Advocacy

Altogether, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 rule out a large class of communication protocols.
This first batch of results implies that efficient and robust outcomes may be achieved only
through a specific arrangement: multi-sender protocols where communication is sequential
and senders are opposed-biased. I hereafter refer to these arrangements as public advocacy,
as they involve the sequential and public consultation of senders with conflicting interests.
The following proposition shows that public advocacy yields efficient equilibria.
Proposition 4 (Public advocacy). Consider a protocol with N = 2 senders that communicate sequentially and are opposed-biased, i.e., ∆u2 (0) < 0 < ∆u1 (0). There exists an
6

In many applications, it may not be feasible for senders to coordinate on the spot because, e.g., it
takes time to prepare a report. In these cases, communication cannot be considered sequential. Efficiency
would be compromised anyway by senders’ collusion via pre-play communication (see Proposition 2).
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efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
ρ1 (θ) = θ


min{r

ρ2 (r1 , θ) = 

¯

2 (0), θ}

θ

p are s.t. β(r1 , r2 ) =

∀θ∈Θ
if θ < 0 ≤ r1
otherwise.



a+

if r1 ≥ 0 and r2 > r2 (0)
¯
otherwise.


a−

Proof. Given beliefs p and sender 2’s strategy, truthful reporting is strictly dominant for
sender 1 in every state. Given beliefs p and sender 1’s strategy: (i) if r1 < 0, then truthful
reporting is always strictly dominant for sender 2, as β(·) = a− for every r2 ; (ii) if r1 ≥ 0
and θ ≥ 0, then truthful reporting is strictly dominant for sender 2 because action a− can
be induced only by delivering a r2 ≤ r2 (0) which, by definition of reach, is never profitable
¯
in non-negative states; (iii) if r1 ≥ 0 and θ < 0, then sender 2 can induce action a−
only by delivering some r2 ≤ r2 (0). By definition of reach, r2 = min{r2 (0), θ} is strictly
¯
¯
dominant in this case. Given senders’ strategies, beliefs p are pinned down by Bayes’ rule
only for r1 = r2 , and are free otherwise. When reports are identical, the receiver assigns
probability 1 to θ = r1 = r2 . Off-path beliefs are free and set as in Proposition 4. Since
senders play truthful strategies, have no profitable individual deviations, and beliefs are
according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible, this is an efficient equilibrium.
Proposition 4 provides an equilibrium characterization, which allows us to understand
the mechanism supporting truthful reporting on the equilibrium path. The key to efficiency
in public advocacy stands in how the receiver allocates the burden of proof between the
two senders.7 Beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’ rule when senders deliver identical
reports in a truthful equilibrium. In these cases, the receiver always follows the senders’
recommendations. By contrast, beliefs are free in all those cases where senders disagree.
The construction of suitable off path beliefs is crucial in sustaining truthful equilibria.
To illustrate the role of beliefs, consider the case where sender 1 prefers a+ and sender 2
prefers a− . Recall that sender 1 speaks first.8 When sender 1 recommends its least favorite
action a− (i.e., r1 < 0), the receiver selects a− no matter what sender 2 reports. By
contrast, when sender 1 suggests its favorite action a+ (i.e., r1 ≥ 0), the receiver’s decision
depends on what sender 2 reports. In this case, sender 2 can convince the receiver to
select a− only by delivering a report dominated in non-negative states (i.e., r2 ≤ r2 (0)).
¯
7

Since the receiver fully learns the state after sequentially consulting two opposed-biased senders,
efficiency can be achieved by public advocacy protocols with N ≥ 2 senders. The focus on N = 2, based
on a minimality principle, is therefore without loss of generality.
8
The order in which senders communicate is irrelevant for the result in Proposition 4.
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Intuitively, the receiver follows sender 1’s advice to choose a+ only if sender 2 fails to
provide undeniable evidence that the state is negative. The burden of proof allocation
ensures that senders have no incentive to deviate from truthful reporting.9
The “adversarial” structure of public advocacy provides an additional benefit: the
senders, having conflicting goals, cannot coordinate to influence the receiver’s decision.
Resilience to collusion is desirable in organizations where informed agents can discuss
their intentions before being consulted by the receiver. The following corollary confirms
that the protocol in Proposition 4 is robust to non-binding pre-play communication.
Corollary 1. The PBE in Proposition 4 is strong.
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that there is no profitable coalitional
deviation involving two opposed-biased senders. Likewise, the receiver cannot gain from a
coalitional deviation because the equilibrium is already efficient. Therefore, the equilibrium
in Proposition 4 is strong (Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof (Bernheim et al., 1987).

5

Discussion

Findings in the previous section show that there is a unique communication protocol
that is efficient and resilient to collusion. This protocol, called public advocacy, requires
the receiver to consult sequentially and publicly (at least) two senders with conflicting
interests. This section discusses the robustness of these findings.
The model assumes that senders can neither withhold information nor deliver vague
reports. The results do not rely on these limitations. Consider an extended model where
senders can omit or muddle information at a cost.10 Every equilibrium of the main model
is also an equilibrium of this extended model where the receiver interprets unexpected
omissions or vagueness unfavorably. Augmenting the senders’ action space cannot make
them worse off, and therefore inefficient protocols remain inefficient in this extended model.
As a result, public advocacy remains the only efficient and robust protocol.
Naturally, there some model variants that can make public advocacy sub-optimal.
Hereafter, I identify some of these alterations. First, public advocacy requires the
consultation of two senders with opposed goals. However, organizations may be constrained
in the availability of informed agents, and have no advocates to consult. Alternatively,
interactions with conflicting agents may have additional exogenous costs, e.g., due to
9

As set in Proposition 4, the burden of proof is reminiscent of the “onus” applied in trials before
tribunals. In legal disputes, one party is initially presumed to be correct. In contrast, the other party is
burdened by providing sufficiently persuasive evidence to prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
10
Vagueness and omissions are easily detectable, whereas misreporting is not. Organizations can
replace or decrease the budget of managers known to be perfectly informed and yet purposefully refuse to
provide accurate information.
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diplomatic relations. The proof of Proposition 2 tells us that in these cases efficiency can
be achieved by forbidding pre-play communication and then privately consulting two (or
more) like-biased senders. Second, public advocacy has a sequential structure that is time
consuming. Simultaneous or single-sender protocols may be optimal when time delays are
prohibitively costly.
It is assumed that the receiver’s action space is binary. This modeling choice introduces
an element of limited liability: the receiver cannot discipline senders with the threat of
taking extreme actions that damage everyone. Removing this assumption makes private
advocacy (simultaneous protocols with opposed biased senders) also efficient and robust
to collusion. Efficiency is obtained by triggering extreme actions when senders deliver
different reports off the equilibrium path. This threat supports truthful reporting on-path,
yielding efficient outcomes. Robustness to collusion is obtained as in Corollary 1.
Two additional extensions are worth discussing. First, the model assumes that senders
know the state perfectly. A model variant with imperfectly informed senders injects an
information aggregation problem over a purely strategic problem of information elicitation.
The receiver’s need to aggregate information makes protocols with more senders more
appealing. Second, it is assumed that truthful reporting is costless. However, senders
and the organization may incur substantial consultation costs. The need to economize
on consultations makes protocols with fewer senders more appealing. Importantly, these
two last model variants prevent efficient outcomes by default: without perfectly informed
senders, the receiver cannot make fully informed decisions; without a costless report,
communication always involves inefficient expenditures.

6

Concluding Remarks

This paper studies the optimal design of organizations that seek informed decision-making
while limiting influence activities. Efficient communication protocols solve asymmetric
information problems without wasteful signaling expenditures. The main result has
potentially significant implications for the design of organizations. It suggests that, under
the threat of senders’ collusion, only one communication protocol can achieve efficiency.
This protocol prescribes the sequential and public consultation of two informed agents
with conflicting interests. This finding provides a rationale for public advocacy.
The model has two distinguishing features central to the main result. First, the
organization incurs direct costs from influence activities. Public advocacy is uniquely
optimal only if this is the case. Fully revealing equilibria exist in simultaneous protocols,
and full revelation is sufficient for optimality when the organization does not incur direct
influence costs. Second, senders can engage in non-binding, pre-play communication.

12
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Public advocacy is not the uniquely efficient protocol when collusion is not a concern: the
proof of Proposition 2 shows that, in these cases, simultaneous and like-bias protocols can
also yield efficient outcomes.
Public advocacy is widespread. As an example, consider the justice system. Trials take
place with an adversarial procedure of judicial decision-making, whereby two advocates
– prosecutors and defendants – engage in public debates in the courtroom. The justice
system cares about accurate decision-making: to acquit the innocent and convict the
guilty. In addition, there are reasons to believe that the justice system also cares about
the influence activities performed by its members. For example, it is surely preferred that
attorneys dedicate their time to reducing court delays rather than tampering with evidence.
Moreover, the system loses credibility when advocates interfere with investigations. Results
from this paper suggest that private advocacy trials, where prosecutors and defendants
submit their cases in a closed envelope to the judge, would result in systematic misreporting.
Any arrangements of trials other than public advocacy would result in inefficiencies.11

11

Other examples of public advocacy include, e.g., managers and ministries competing for budget
allocation. Budgeting processes are typically sequential. Both firms and governments prefer their members
to dedicate resources to everyday job duties rather than unproductive influence activities.
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A

Appendix

The following results are taken from Vaccari (2021). They are not meant for publication.
Result 1. Misreporting occurs in every PBE of protocols with N = 2 opposed biased
senders that communicate simultaneously.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PBE where misreporting never occurs, that is, where
ρ1 (θ) = ρ2 (θ) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ. Consider such a truthful equilibrium, two opposed
biased senders with ∆u2 (0) < 0 < ∆u1 (0), and a state θ =  > 0, where  is small enough.
To discourage deviations, off path beliefs must be such that β(, −) = a+ . However, there
always exists an  > 0 such that, when the state is θ = −, sender 1 can profitably deviate
from the prescribed truthful strategy by reporting r1 = , as ∆u1 (−) > C1 (, −). This
contradicts that there exists an equilibrium where misreporting never occurs.
Result 2. PBE in truthful strategies of protocols with N > 2 senders that communicate
simultaneously are not coalition-proof.
Proof. Consider protocols with more than two senders that communicate simultaneously.
Define the sets of senders Z = {j | ∆uj (0) > 0} and Y = {i | ∆ui (0) < 0}, and the profile
of reports r̃Z = {rj }j∈Z and r̃Y = {ri }i∈Y . Say that r̃L = x when rj = x for all j ∈ L.
The receiver’s decision rule is β(r̃Z , r̃Y ). In a truthful equilibrium, r̃Z = r̃Y = θ for all
θ ∈ Θ. Given a state θ = − < 0, beliefs are such that β(−, −) = a− and β(, ) = a+ .
Suppose that off path beliefs are such that β(, −) = a+ , and take  small enough12 so
that r̄j (−) ≥  for every j ∈ Z. Denote by r̃Z∗ = {rj∗ }j∈Z a profile of reports with the
following features: β(r̃Z∗ , −) = a+ , and β({rj }j∈Z , −) = a− if Cj (rj , −) ≤ Cj (rj∗ , −)
for every j ∈ Z, with a strict inequality for some j. We know that the report r̃Z∗ exists
because β(, −) = a+ , and therefore rj∗ ≤  for every j ∈ Z. There is a coalition formed
by all senders in Z such that, when the state is θ = −, each j ∈ Z can deviate to rj∗ ∈ r̃Z∗ .
This deviation is mutually beneficial and self-enforcing: by construction of r̃Z∗ , there is no
proper sub-coalition that, taking fixed the action of its complement, can agree to deviate
from the deviation in a way that makes all of its members better off. Therefore, equilibria
in truthful strategies are not coalition-proof (Bernheim et al., 1987).

If instead beliefs are such that β(, −) = a− , then the proof is similar by considering a state
θ =  > 0 small enough and a deviation from the coalition of senders i ∈ Y .
12
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